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In both academia and lay political culture, democracy has been enshrined 
as the system that best respects all citizens’ freedom and political equality. 
However, it is worth inquiring whether we can trust democracy – the 
rule of the many, some of whom are neither informed and interested nor 
impartial – to produce good decisions systematically. In an optimistic 
and rigorously argued work, Robert Goodin and Kai Spiekermann 
claim we can. Compared with all familiar political systems, they assert, 
democracies produce decisions of the highest epistemic quality. In fact, 
the more people we enfranchise in making choices, the more likely they 
will choose the correct option. In the following pages, I will review the 
authors’ sternly modeled arguments, present their modifications of tra-
ditional theories, and prod whether their assumptions genuinely hold. 
Goodin and Spiekermann build their analysis upon Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem (CJT). In short, the theorem claims that the many always 
outsmart the few, as long as several assumptions are in place. The clas-
sic CJT framework involves n voters choosing between two alternatives 
through majority rule. According to Condorcet, if citizens vote sincerely, 
are independent of each other in judging the state of the world, and are 
likelier than random to choose the correct option – or, more rigorously, 
if the probability of them making the right choice exceeds p = 0.5 – the 
likelihood of them choosing the right option converges towards certainty 
as their number increases (p. 18). In brief, the CJT makes two sweeping 
claims. First, the majority vote of a group of (independent, competent 
and sincere) voters is more likely to be right than any individual voter 
separately. Second, as the number of such voters nears infinity, the prob-
ability the majority of them is correct approaches one. As a consequence, 
the massive electorates typical of contemporary politics should be nearly 
infallible.
Goodin and Spiekermann spend the first portion of the book scru-
tinizing the scenarios of there not being a single truth and defending 
the CJT’s assumptions about competence, sincerity and independence. 
The authors are not particularly concerned about the options of the 
right answer not being on the agenda and of there being multiple 
truths. It is entirely consistent with the CJT for citizens to correctly 
choose whatever option they consider best, even if it is not the absolute 
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ideal (p. 42). Regarding the CJT’s assumptions, first, there is sincerity. 
According to Goodin and Spiekermann, the CJT is violated if citizens 
vote strategically or as a political statement, rather than for the option 
they genuinely deem best. However, as game-theoretic schemes are a 
considerable cognitive load, the authors conclude sincerity will be the 
default, and only a minority of voters will choose to waste their vote on 
convoluted schemes (p. 49). Second, there is competence. As we have 
said, the CJT presupposes that individual voters are minimally compe-
tent, which is to say, better than random. And while the CJT claims the 
aggregated vote of minimally qualified voters converges to perfection, it 
offers an equally firm warning that incompetent citizens’ amassed voices 
near disaster. In that sense, theorists from Plato to Condorcet himself 
have feared that people’s rampant ignorance would drive democracy in 
the latter direction.
Nonetheless, the fact that empirical evidence has shown citizens to 
be grossly uninformed about fundamental political data does not trouble 
Goodin and Spiekermann. After all, the CJT does not require citizens 
to be all-knowing, but only that they are likelier than random to be 
correct. Once they have passed the magical boundary of 0.5, all further 
improvements in competence have a limited epistemic effect. Besides, 
ignorant voters can use political cues – such as what their preferred 
party is proposing – to identify the correct option. They can also improve 
their epistemic standing through deliberation and pool knowledge with 
others whose judgments they trust to be similar to their own. Even so, 
we should be genuinely concerned if there was something – a bias, a 
heuristic or prejudice – that systematically made the voters worse than 
random in selecting the correct option. Although this sounds like a le-
gitimate qualm, as citizens have been empirically shown to vote based on 
disputed stereotypes and identity prejudice, Goodin and Spiekermann 
briefly presume this is not, in fact, a breach of competence but a breach 
of independence, and proceed to the next topic.
Speaking of independence, the authors provide an entire list of 
conditions that violate the CJT’s Independence Assumption. To be 
specific, voters are not independent if they depend “on the same shared 
opinion leader, on the same shared ideology or prejudice, on the same 
shared psychological mechanisms, on the same shared cues, on the same 
more fundamental shared properties, and the same shared evidence, 
background information, or theories” (p. 55). From this it is unclear 
whether there could ever be an electorate that does not depend on the 
“same shared psychological mechanism” or “the same shared evidence”. 
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If this criticism is warranted, then the CJT is useless for all practical 
purposes. However, the authors claim the promising CJT results can 
still obtain in the case of dependence, as long as we are not dealing with 
extreme instances of all voters following the same, grossly incompetent 
opinion leader. Knowing that we seldom access the state of the world 
directly but instead use evidence or testimony, the authors introduce 
what they call the “best responder corollary” (p. 76). According to this 
modification, the voters are independent and competent if they can 
emulate the best responder in the given epistemic circumstances. While 
this adjustment indeed makes the CJT more permissive, it still does not 
mean the aggregated vote of citizens who are systematically worse than 
random would not converge to disaster. 
In the second section, Goodin and Spiekermann discuss epistemic 
enhancement. Namely, according to the classic CJT, there are two ways 
to improve the epistemic performance of groups making decisions. One 
is to increase the number of voters with more citizens who are on aver-
age better than random. The other is to make existing decision-makers 
more competent than they previously were. Recall that the CJT shows 
how groups can be more capable than the agents who comprise them, 
as long as the members are epistemically minimally competent and 
independent of one another. Still, the more competent these members 
are, the less it will take for the group to converge to perfection. Goodin 
and Spiekermann argue that we do not need excessive gains in individual 
competence. According to them, “bumping mean individual competence 
from p = 0.51 to p = 0.55 will help group competence enormously. […] 
More heroically bumping mean individual competence up from p = 0.6 
to p = 0.7 will make much less difference, in comparison” (p. 86). It is 
acceptable that many people are utterly incompetent in many random 
ways as long as the majority still pushes the collective result in the cor-
rect direction. This framework works, they argue, because the random 
incorrect votes will cancel each other out. As this is simply a modified 
reiteration of the competence assumption, it remains uncertain how we 
should approach the fact that many empirical voters seem to be utterly 
incompetent in precisely the same way, as they abide by the same sources 
of information and listen to the same authorities. Unburdened by such 
concerns, Goodin and Spiekermann note that uninformed voters can 
take cues – such as party belonging or “some particularly salient fac-
toid” – to make them select the correct alternative (p. 91). Conceding 
that it is challenging for people to revise erroneous facts once they have 
embraced them, the authors propose civic education to set voters on a 
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better epistemic footing. While such programs are undoubtedly desirable, 
here they seem like an inadequate response to a massive epistemic failure.
Goodin and Spiekermann’s remaining strategies for epistemic en-
hancement are diversity, making it more likely for wrong votes to cancel 
each other out, and the division of epistemic labor, which would allow 
groups of citizens to consider options a few at a time. However, they 
place the most trust in deliberation, which they claim can increase group 
competence by increasing individual competence and can lead to sincerer 
voting. If that was not enough, it can also somehow reduce dependence, 
increase the probability that the circumstances and evidence are truth-
conducive, and adjust the decision problem by adding new evidence. 
While the other effects are more self-evident, the authors – who had 
previously noted how arduous it is to reject facts we have come to trust 
– make the psychologically unconvincing assumption that deliberation 
can make voters realize they have placed their trust in the wrong sources 
of information, rather than cause factionalism. Even so, since they make 
only the modest claim that “discussion and deliberation improve smaller 
and more discursive groups’ competence by a small amount”, this hasty 
presumption is not as problematic as it might otherwise be.
Moving onto structures of government, Goodin and Spiekermann 
first inquire whether an epistocracy, a rule by the experts, would have 
better epistemic performance than a democracy. As expected, they con-
clude it would not. A single “smartest guy” would have to be incredibly 
competent for his ability to approach the almost perfect competence of 
a large electorate composed of people just slightly better than random 
(p. 228). Likewise, a “smartest clique of guys” far more competent than 
the average voter cannot compare with the aggregated competence of a 
mass of citizens just p = 0.522 likely to be right (p. 229). In their reading, 
even if a smaller group benefitted from all available avenues of epistemic 
improvement – it deliberated, divided the epistemic labor and relied on 
truth-conducive evidence – it would remain less likely to be right than 
a massive electorate comprised of above-average voters. Goodin and 
Spiekermann also use this discussion of epistocracy – which they are 
visibly not in favor of – to argue that the sheer experience of voting can 
turn incompetents into competent voters. Unlike experts, who are as-
sumed to have a fixed superior competence, average voters gain in ability 
with each round of voting, up until their group’s collective competence 
becomes attuned to the CJT model. Their discussion of direct and repre-
sentative democracy features an identical argument but with a different 
conclusion. Here, Goodin and Spiekermann claim that small groups of 
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representatives can be epistemically better off than large electorates, as 
long as their members are on average more competent – as they have 
been selected in virtue of their superior competence – and engage in 
fruitful deliberation. It remains unclear why this strategy can work for 
groups of representatives but not for groups of experts.
Next up, Goodin and Spiekermann discuss institutional hindrances 
and aids to epistemic success. Unsurprisingly, the main obstacle is any 
institutional arrangement that gives smaller groups a decisive rather than 
a purely advisory role in the decision-making process. After all, the CJT 
teaches us that the majority in a larger group is more likely to be right. 
Such “epistemic bottlenecks” are, for instance, small legislative com-
mittees that do the preliminary work on legislation, primarily as larger 
assemblies are often quite deferential towards smaller ones’ suggestions. 
However, this hindrance can be at least partially overcome if the smaller 
chamber reaps the benefits of deliberation and selection, which, we recall, 
did not work for experts. Other familiar barriers are strong leaders who 
dictate their followers’ views, which can be mitigated if several such 
influencers neutralize each other. The final impediment entirely in tune 
with Goodin and Spiekermann’s earlier verdicts are presidential vetoes or 
any instance where an individual gets to overrule a more massive body’s 
decision, which is always likelier to be right. Moving on, they divide 
the institutional aids into (i) mechanisms to make decision situations 
more truth conducive, (ii) mechanisms to increase independence, (iii) 
mechanisms to increase competence, and (iv) mechanisms to increase 
sincerity. In short, we can make it easier for voters to select the correct 
choice by supporting them in finding better alternatives through struc-
tured deliberation. Political parties can also narrow the range of options 
by weeding out bad and confusing options, and decision situations can 
be made more truth conducive by improving the evidence base through 
deliberation and expert panels. In the following section, voters become 
more independent if elections are publicly funded and publicly broadcast 
as they can then access unbiased information on which they can base their 
votes. When it comes to mechanisms for increasing competence, Goodin 
and Spiekermann reiterate that increasing individual competence can 
have but a limited effect, as the CJT takes care of making voters more 
competent as a group. Even so, civic education and teaching citizens to 
rely on the right kind of cues might pay off in the long term. Finally, 
voters might be made sincerer if they deliberate and articulate their 
reasons for supporting a particular option. However, it could be argued 
that this would violate the Independence Assumption.
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In a lengthy epilogue, Goodin and Spiekermann address two politi-
cal outcomes that cast doubt on democracy’s capacity to produce correct 
decisions: the result of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom 
and the election of Donald Trump in the United States. How is it pos-
sible that massive electorates – the probability of whom making the right 
choice should be near certain – opted for such questionable outcomes? 
To attune these outcomes to their conclusions, Goodin and Spiekermann 
attempt to discern which assumptions of CJT have been violated to allow 
for such disastrous decisions. Their most prominent finding is that both 
campaigns lied. The Brexit campaign flaunted an actual bus starring a 
provable falsehood, and Donald Trump has been calculated to lie once 
every three minutes. A possible answer might be that voters had different 
priorities than those theorists who consider these outcomes catastrophic: 
Trump’s Rust Belt voters, for instance, feared immigration and desired 
someone who would defend their industries. Trump promised to ad-
dress both of those concerns. Goodin and Spiekermann also entertain 
the possibility that the voters considered anything to be better than the 
status quo or intended to send a strategic signal about their dissatisfac-
tion, never expecting the chosen option to win. Unlike Brexit, Trump’s 
campaign launched an assault on objective truth, inaugurating concepts 
such as “fake news” and “alternative facts” that couched his supporters 
in a different reality than the one inhabited by the rest of society. In 
sum, Goodin and Spiekermann conclude that the voters had differing 
priorities, values, and interests than those who judge the outcome of the 
Brexit campaign to be unfavorable and that Trump’s supporters fell for a 
particularly epistemically insouciant opinion leader. After all, they have 
stressed that large groups’ competence converges towards perfection but 
never reaches it, so it is to be expected that even massive electorates will 
occasionally make the wrong decision.
While Goodin and Spiekermann’s work is a timely contribution 
to a dynamic subject and a pioneering extensive work in this promis-
ing area of investigation, their book falls short of the reassuring effect 
they had intended. In the contemporary epistemic climate, the CJT’s 
assumptions of competence and independence seem unreachable. The 
authors themselves openly list several obstacles that make CJT’s require-
ments appear better suited to an ideal world than to our real epistemic 
circumstances. Writing about voter competence, they remark it would 
be unfortunate for democracy if all voters were to err in the same way 
systematically, take note of our shared heuristics and cognitive biases, and 
even concede that prejudices such as racism, sexism, and xenophobia are 
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ubiquitous (p. 53). It is evident from their mere wording that, in such a 
social context, it would be outlandish for most voters – and, in particular, 
untrained, uninterested voters – not to err in the same way systematically. 
Analyzing Brexit and Trump’s election, they identify the deleterious ef-
fect of closed online communities, epistemic bubbles, and personalized 
newsfeeds in restricting information flow (p. 355). Knowing that most 
voters now acquire the bulk of their news from the Internet, it would be 
overly optimistic to conclude that algorithmic filtering, which exposes 
voters only to what they like to see, would not violate the Independence 
Assumption. If their beaming trust in democracy appears unwarranted, 
so does their distrust in experts, who seem not to benefit from the same 
aids – deliberation and superior competence – that do good to democratic 
representatives and smaller legislative committees. Although Goodin 
and Spiekermann advance a rigorous and considered argument, and 
although this book is perhaps the most comprehensive epistemological 
inquiry into CJT, a convincing epistemic defense of democracy would 




Filip Grgić i Davor Pećnjak (ur.), Free Will & Action: Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives (Cham: Springer, 2018), 154 str.
Djeluju li ljudi slobodno? Koji uvjeti trebaju biti zadovoljeni da bismo 
rekli da je djelatnik moralno odgovoran za svoje čine? Možemo li biti 
slobodni ako je svijet u kojem živimo i djelujemo uređen prema deter-
minističkim zakonima? Ova i slična pitanja stoje u središtu jednog od 
najdugovječnijih i najsloženijih problema u filozofiji. To je problem 
slobode volje. Ukupno deset radova objavljenih u zborniku Free Will 
& Action: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, koji su uredili Filip 
Grgić i Davor Pećnjak, teže otvoriti nove perspektive za rješavanje ovog 
problema. Zbornik je objavljen kao šesti nastavak Springerova niza “Hi-
storical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action” u kojemu se 
